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Previous research has argued that the degree of co-movement of stock returns (the R² 
of a market regression) at country-level can be explained by the interaction of firm-
specific and market-wide information. The R² measure has been used to investigate a 
number  of  issues  of  potentially  great  importance  to  accounting,  such  as  whether 
countries  with  poor  corporate  governance  regimes  and  weak  legal  protection  of 
private property rights are more likely to have poor information environments or to 
assess the informativeness of prices. To date, only limited research has been carried 
out to assess the reliability of an information interpretation of the R² measure at a 
firm-level within a country rather than at an aggregate country level. In this paper we 
now examine the properties of stock returns co-movement at the firm-level within two 
countries, UK and USA, thereby being able to filter out certain extraneous factors that 
could  arise  in  cross-country  settings.  We  analyse  the  performance  of  this  overall 
measure by triangulating it with other information-related measures which previous 
research has suggested capture partial aspects of the information environment. We 
find some serious flaws in the methodology and our findings suggest that when using 
it at firm-level, it may be being driven by other factors related to uninformed trading. 
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1.  Introduction 
Roll‟s (1988) seminal paper tests the asset pricing paradigm that stock returns 
can be explained by pervasive factors, industry influences and events unique to the 
firm,  by  using  the  R²  of  a  regression  of  firm‟s  returns  on  economy-wide  factors. 
Results show that asset pricing theories explain poorly ex post stock returns, leaving 
the causes of this poor performance open to debate. Roll (1988, 542) concludes: “The 
results  are  not  very  gratifying.  …  We  ought  to  discover  either  (a)  measurable 
influences that will explain the remaining [R²] or (b) a coherent reason why it should 
forever remain unexplained.” Arguably, however, the biggest impact this research has 
had on the finance literature has been in the use of R² as a measure of the quality of 
firm-specific information available to investors rather than of the adequacy of an asset 
pricing theory. As Morck et al. (2000, 216) states, “[s]tock returns reflect new market-
level and firm-level information. As Roll (1988) makes clear, the extent to which 
stocks move together depends on the relative amounts of firm-level and market-level 
information capitalized into stock prices.” 
Recent research using Roll‟s (1988) methodology presents strong conclusions 
on the quality of information environments both at the country-level and at the firm-
level. Morck et al.‟s (2000) landmark paper in this new stream of research argues that 
R² captures the quality of investor protection rights and corporate governance regimes 
and, therefore, the amount of firm-specific information incorporated into prices.  
The critical issue is whether R² is an adequate measure of the quality of the 
firm-specific information environment. There is very little evidence to support the use 
of R² for this purpose. The papers using this methodology take for granted that R² is a 
robust measure without questioning its suitability. There is a huge gap between Roll‟s   3 
(1988)  conclusion  and  Morck  et  al.‟s  (2000)  assumption  about  the  quality  of  the 
measure. Furthermore, Roll‟s (1988) objective is clearly different. He views high R²s 
favourably,  that  is  as  being  indicative  of  an  asset  price  theory  having  descriptive 
power,  while  Morck  et  al.  (2000)  regards  low  R²s  as  being  indicative  of  a  good 
information environment where investors have access to high quality firm-specific 
information. 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2005) replicate Morck et al. (2000) in order to test 
the soundness of their conclusions and then use a battery of tests relating R² to firm 
fundamentals that theory and prior empirical research suggest capture some of the key 
aspects  of the quality of a firm‟s information  environment  (e.g. abnormal returns, 
analyst forecast errors, analyst following, firm size, stock turnover, whether the firm 
has made a loss, and standard deviation of sales). Their results provide little support 
for an informational interpretation of R². Our study extends Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.‟s 
(2005) results in a number of ways, notably by relaxing some of the assumptions 
made in the R² literature
1. Our results confirm and strengthen their conclusions of the 
inadequacy of R² as a measure of information.  
The literature based on using R² as a measure of  the overall quality of the 
information environment also presents a methodology for disentangling the  overall 
measure into the effects of pervasive factors (market and industry) and firm -specific 
factors, by decomposing the R² into components representing these factors (Durnev et 
al. 2001; Morck et al. 2000). We extend our analysis to examine such decompositions 
and find that they share similar problems to R² as measures of information quality.  
                                                 
1 Namely, we relax sample constraints related to extreme observations, previously classified as errors 
and  we  also  analyse  model  constraints  resulting  from  the  deletion/inclusion  of  an  industry  returns 
variable.   4 
We  use  firm-level  data  from  the  USA  and  the  UK  to  investigate  the 
performance  and  validity  of  within-country  firm-level  R²  and  its  components  as 
measures  of  firm-specific  information.  We  focus  on  these  two  countries  for  two 
reasons. Firstly, these two countries have highly developed capital markets, strong 
investor property rights and disclosure regimes  oriented to serving investor needs. 
Secondly, Morck et al.‟s (2000) findings indicate that, despite these similarities, the 
average R² for the UK is three times larger than that for the USA, suggesting that the 
latter  has  a  markedly  better  information  environment.  By  focusing  on  these  two 
countries, we are able to abstract from the problems involved in comparing countries 
at different stages of development in their capital markets. We use firm-level data to 
enable  us  to  explore  the  relationship  between  firm-specific  characteristics  and  the 
measures proposed for the quality of the information environment.  
Our results confirm the declining trend over time in overall R² found in prior 
literature. Alternative explanations can be used to describe such a decline. Morck et al. 
(2000) argue that it is due an increase of firm-specific information. However, such 
trend can also be explained by an increase in firm-specific stock returns‟ volatility as 
documented  in  Campbell  et  al.  (2001).  It  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  thesis  to 
determine the determinants of such an effect. Contrary to Morck et al. (2000), our 
results indicate that the relevance of pervasive factors has remained roughly constant 
over the last twenty years.  
Previous research has shown that bid-ask spread and book-to-market ratio are 
important attributes related to the quality of a firm‟s information environment. Bid-ask 
spread  is  a  widely  used  indicator  of  the  information  asymmetries  facing  market 
makers  (e.g.  Brooks  1994;  Copeland  and  Galai  1983;  Glosten  1987;  Glosten  and 
Milgrom  1985).  Book-to-market  ratio  captures  growth  expectations  (e.g.  Penman   5 
1996) and inadequacies of the accounting model to reflect value creation on a timely 
basis  (e.g.  Chambers  2002;  Lev  2001;  Lev  and  Zarowin  1999).  Neither  of  these 
measures are employed in the Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2005) and Kelly (2005) studies 
of R². We extend these other studies by including bid-ask spread and book-to-market, 
together with firm size and analyst following, in our regression models. We find that 
these variables are poorly correlated with R² and its components. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 summarises 
prior work in this area. Section 3 presents our research design. Section 4 presents our 
sample selection and the construction of metrics. Section 5 presents empirical tests 
and a discussion of the results. Finally, section 6 draws conclusions and establishes 
the path for future research. 
2.  Prior research 
We start by considering the original use made of R² by Roll (1988) and the 
extensions introduced by subsequent researchers in this tradition. 
Roll  (1988) regresses firm‟s  returns on economy-wide factors
2  to test  the 
asset paradigm that stock returns can be explained by pervasive factors, industry 
influences and events unique to the firm. High R²s mean that pervasive factors have 
high explanatory power. Conversely, a low R² indicates that firm -specific factors not 
                                                 
2 Roll (1988) starts by using only market returns as an explanatory variable and then extends his model 
to incorporate an industry factor. The addition of the industry factor improves the model‟s coefficient of 
determination and, therefore, results in a more refined measure of the residuals that are interpreted 
relating to firm-specific information. Roll (1988) uses the one factor CAPM and the multi factor APT 
model; both models produce similar results.   6 
included in the model are driving returns.
3 To verify the extent to which firm-specific 
events are affecting R², he runs the same regression excluding from the sample all 
dates corresponding to firm-specific events. Results from this second approach seem 
“to  imply  the  existence  of  either  private  information  or  else  occasional  frenzy 
unrelated to concrete information” (Roll 1988, 566). Cornell (1990) and Robin (1993) 
take  this  further,  by  excluding  days  when  firm-specific  trading  volume  is  high, 
arguing that such days are likely to be ones where there is an abnormal firm-specific 
information flow. Their results are stronger than Roll‟s (1988) but the picture is still 
essentially unchanged. Finally, Brown (1999) sharpens the focus by eliminating dates 
when  both  firm-specific  information  is  made  publicly  available  and  dates  when 
corporate insiders acquired or sold shares, aiming to disentangle the effect of both 
private and public information. He finds that R² remains largely unchanged by the 
exclusion  or  inclusion  of  information  days  and  concludes  that  “…  economists‟ 
inability to explain asset price movements is the result of either noise or naïve asset 
price models” (Brown 1999, 633). In short, these later studies have not been able to 
rule out Roll‟s (1988) conjecture that low R²s might at least in part be driven by 
behavioural factors.  
A new stream of research has developed, using Roll‟s (1988) methodology. 
This  new  work  assumes  that  the  R²  methodology  is  robust  enough  to  allow 
conclusions to be drawn about the quality of countries‟ information environments, 
Morck et  al.  (2000) show that higher R²s  are associated with  countries  with  poor 
                                                 
3 A low R² could also be due, of course, to the omission of other nondiversifiable factors priced by the 
market.  In  other  words,  the  effectiveness  of  R²  as  a  measure  of  the  presence  or  absence  of 
(diversifiable)  firm-specific  information  depends  on  how  good  our  asset  pricing  theories  are.  This 
aspect of the problem is beyond the scope of the present paper.    7 
economic  performance,  weak  corporate  governance  and  inadequate  protection  of 
private property rights. The reasoning underlying this perspective is that information-
based trading becomes more attractive in the presence of strong property rights that 
allow more firm-specific information to be capitalised and, therefore, results in less 
stock price synchronicity. Furthermore, they show that in the USA and the UK R²s are 
very low compared to  most other countries,  which they attribute to the very high 
levels of firm-specific information available to investors in America and Britain.  
Morck et al. (2000) also present a decomposition of R² into two components 
reflecting firm-specific variation and market-wide variation. Disentangling these two 
effects  they  suggest  allows  a  more  refined  study  of  the  drivers  of  R²  and, 
consequently, a potentially more precise interpretation of the quality of firm-specific 
information. As other researchers have ignored this suggested decomposition of R² 
and  its  reliability  as  a  measure  of  information  is  still  open  to  debate,  and  its 
performance is evaluated in this paper.  
Jin and Myers (2004) seek to explain Morck et al‟s (2000) finding that R²s 
are  higher  in  countries  with  less  developed  capital  markets  and  weaker  corporate 
governance regimes.
4 They provide a model to explain how control rights and the 
opaqueness of information affect managerial behaviour. Using three measures of 
opaqueness (a survey-based measure of the adequacy of financial disclosure, size of 
the audit profession, and diversity of analyst forecasts); they find that countries where 
firms tend to be more opaque have higher R² and higher frequencies of crashes. 
                                                 
4See also Li et al. (2003). They find that R² is negatively associated with the degree of openness of 
capital markets. They also find that the negative relationship only holds when the countries have strong 
corporate governance regimes; otherwise, the relationship is positive.    8 
Following Morck et al. (2000), they compute R² for each firm in their sample and 
aggregate them into country-level R²s.  
Generally speaking, in a cross-country setting, prior research suggests that 
the  R²  measure  seems  to  perform  well  as  an  inverse  proxy  for  firm-specific 
information  being  capitalised  into  prices,  in  the  sense  that  R²  rankings  correlate 
reasonably well with prior expectations about the country information environment. 
Alves et al. (2006) suggests this interpretation is faulty. The same rationales applied at 
the  firm-level  and,  within  a  given  country,  would  lead  to  the  expectation  that  an 
individual  firm‟s  R²  would  be  associated  with  the  quality  of  its  firm-specific 
environment.  
Some  studies  also  have  employed  the  R²  methodology  at  the  firm  level. 
Durnev et al. (2001) find that firms with lower R²s exhibit higher association between 
current returns and future earnings, indicating that R² appears to be capturing some 
relevant aspects of the information environment. However, caution must be exercised 
in interpreting this result as Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.‟s (2005) replication shows that 
results are very sensitive to country and sample selection. 
Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) address the question of why some US firms 
exhibit  a  higher  degree  of  co-movement  than  others,  by  examining  the  effect  of 
trading activities of insiders, institutional investors and financial analysts, using R² to 
measure  the  relative  amount  of  firm-specific  information  capitalised  into  prices. 
Results  show  that  the  trading  activities  of  these  market  participants  affect  the 
information  environment  at  firm-level,  but  in  different  directions:  more  analyst 
activity and higher institutional holdings result in more stock return synchronicity, 
while  greater  insider  trading  results  in  more  firm-specific  information  being 
capitalised into prices. They argue that the ultimate goal of analysts is to incorporate   9 
more industry-level information into prices and, by doing so, this leads to more co-
movement. The authors acknowledge that stock return synchronicity could also be due 
to uninformed trading, but treat this as a second-order effect. However, their research 
design relies very heavily on a strong interpretation of Roll‟s (1988) results and on an 
untested extrapolation of Morck et al.‟s (2000) country-level findings to a firm-level 
framework. 
More closely related to our study, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2005) use Morck 
et al.‟s (2000) approach and confirm their results on the behaviour of R², but disagree 
on its interpretation. Using R² at the firm-level in a small set of countries, Ashbaugh-
Skaife et  al.  (2005)  find that R² is  only weakly  associated with  measures  of firm 
fundamentals (e.g. abnormal returns, analyst forecast errors, analyst following, firm 
size, stock turnover, whether the  firm  has  made a loss, and standard  deviation  of 
sales).  Using  a  similar  approach  but  a  different  set  of  information  environment 
proxies,  Kelly  (2005)  also  finds  that  R²  is  a  noisy  measure  of  firm-specific 
information, using a mix of market and micro-structure variables, such as trading cost, 
illiquidity,  probability  of  an  informed  trade,  probability  of  an  information  event, 
amongst others.  
A critical assumption of the papers using the R² methodology is that stock 
return  volatility  arises  only  from  the  arrival  of  new  information  in  the  market. 
However, evidence on this assumption is at best mixed (Lee and Liu 2006). Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997) show that demand unrelated to firm-specific fundamentals affects 
returns volatility.
5 Barberis et al. (2005) document changes in R² around additions and 
                                                 
5  See  also  the  earlier  work  by  Shiller  (1981)  and  West  (1988)  suggesting  that  firm-specific  price 
volatility is too large to be associated with changes in firms‟ fundamentals.   10 
deletions  to  the  S&P  500.  Greenwood  and  Sosner  (2002)  and  Greenwood  (2005) 
document  similar  results  for  the  Nikkei  225  stock  index,  suggesting  that  demand 
shocks not related to stock price fundamentals are an important determinant of stock 
price co-movement: addition to the index results in an overall increase in R² from 0.04 
to 0.15 and deletion from the index results in a reduction from 0.28 to 0.19.  
A related body of work considers the role of investors following a company. 
Lee  et  al.  (1991),  Pindyck  and  Rotemberg  (1993),  Barberis  and  Shleifer  (2003), 
Andrade  et  al.  (2005)  and  Kuman  and  Lee  (2005)  document  the  impact  of  retail 
investors  and  uninformed  investors  on  stock  co-movement,  showing  that  trading 
activities  by  these  classes  of  market  participants  are  characterised  by  a  common 
directional component.  
Several studies have used volatility-type metrics as a measure of information 
asymmetries (e.g. Bhagat et al. 1985; Blackwell et al. 1990; Dierkens 1991). These 
studies  assume  that  both  managers  and  investors  have  the  same  knowledge  about 
market  wide  factors  and,  therefore,  information  asymmetries  will  be  higher  when 
managers  withhold  a  larger  portion  of  relevant  firm-specific  information.  Viewed 
from this perspective, firm-specific volatility is a measure of how much firm-specific 
information is not being shared by managers.  
Campbell et al. (2001) show that market volatility has been stable over time 
while firm-specific volatility has been increasing. As the previous discussion makes 
clear, this could be due either to improved firm-specific information or to increased 
noise  trading,  or  both.  Bennett  and  Sias  (2004)  argue  that  firm-specific  risk  has 
increased  over  the  last  three  decades  due  to  the  growth  of  riskier  industries,  the 
increase of small stocks in the market and a decline in industry concentration. This 
explanation  points  to  a  decline  in  firm-specific  information:  less  is  known  about   11 
riskier industries and smaller firms. This is consistent with the findings of Rajgopal 
and Venkatachalam (2005) that earnings have become of poorer quality and more 
volatile, with the effect being stronger for newly listed stocks (Wei and Zhang 2006).  
As our brief review of the literature makes clear, the picture concerning R² as 
a measure of information quality is a mixed and incomplete one. Our research design 
attempts to consolidate some of the insights of these disparate studies and to take 
research  a  step  forward  by  both  exploring  existent  gaps  in  current  literature  and 
extending the analysis to the R² components.  
Previous research using R² as a measure of firm-specific information deletes 
extreme returns on the assumption that they are errors in the data.
6 Our study explores 
and empirically investigates the validity of such error deletion procedures and finds 
that the „error in  data justification‟ for data deletion is  completely  erroneous and, 
therefore, raises severe doubts over the validity of previous research conclusions. The 
only valid reason for eliminating extreme returns from the database is if they are data 
errors.  Valid  extreme  returns  are  central  to  our  understanding  of  the  information 
environment
7. We show the effects of including such extreme returns on the behaviour 
of R². 
We also explore the opaqueness argument put forward by Jin and Myers 
(2004). Opaqueness is clearly a strong determinant of the quality of  the information 
                                                 
6 As an example, Morck et al (2000) argues that bi-weekly returns above twenty-five percent are errors 
in the data and, therefore, are deleted. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2005) rely on the same assumption when 
replicating Morck et al‟s (2000) and in further tests of reliability of the informational interpretation of 
R². 
7 They can be either the result of noise trading or the result of information events. If extreme returns are 
caused by noise trading, then their erroneous deletion will force the R² measure to appear incorrectly to 
be artificially related to information. However, if they are the result of information shocks, then their 
exclusion from the analyses would clearly be erroneous as their inclusion would then be central  to the 
understanding of the information environment.   12 
environment, leaving more space to private information. Our model captures the level 
of opaqueness by including a measure of the degree of the information asymmetry 
(the bid-ask spread). 
The  model  used  to  compute  R²  varies  across  studies.  The  most  common 
models tend not to use a variable to capture industry effects and to include a variable 
capturing relationship with the US market. We closely follow Roll‟s (1988) original 
paper‟s  reasoning  and  therefore  include  an  industry  variable.  Firm-specific 
information is measured by the R
2 based on the residuals of the returns regression and, 
consequently, the inclusion of this variable not only follows the original rationale of 
the model more closely, but also allows the measurement of the firm-specific variation 
to be more precise. Contrary to prior studies, we do not include a variable capturing 
the effect of US returns. This effect could be market, industry or firm specific and, 
therefore as argued later, is better included in the model by these factors. 
Finally,  we  make  a  new  contribution  to  the  literature  by  providing  an 
empirical  analysis of the reliability of the  firm-specific  and market-wide variation 
components of R
2 as well as to the overall measure previously examined. We are 
particularly  interested  in  the  component  reflecting  firm-specific  variation,  because 
Morck et al. (2000) argue that it should be a more precise measure of the quality of the 
firm-specific information.  
3.  Predictions and research design 
We test the reliability of the informational interpretation of R² by analysing 
the relationship between R² and a set of variables that we consider to capture partial   13 
attributes of the overall information environment
8. Previous research has demonstrated 
the association between the information environment and the information -related 
variables chosen for our main tests ( market value, bid-ask spread, book-to-market 
ratio  and  analyst  following ).  If  R²  is  a  good  (inverse)  proxy  for  firm -specific 
information, we expect it to be associated with those information content variables . 
Conversely, if R²
 is a poor measure, then we would not expect it to be related to 
measures that capture aspects of the information environment. Additionally, we use 
analysts consensus (as measured by the standard deviation of EPS one-year forecasts).  
We  now  briefly  describe  the  rationales  supporting  the  link  between  the 
quality of the information environment and the variables we have chosen to capture 
some of its attributes. There are several links between size and the quality of the 
information environment, not all pointing in the same direction. Larger companies 
tend to be more diversified and have a large number of different business segments. 
Therefore and everything else equal, their information is harder to understand which 
results in a worse information environment compared to a small company operating in 
a  single  industry.  On  the  other  hand,  smaller  firms  tend  to  have  fewer  analysts 
following  them  and  fewer  investors  interested  in  them,  with  the  result  that  firm-
specific  information  might  be  less  readily  impounded  into  prices.  This  might  be 
compounded by small firms being more reluctant to report information that might be 
used by competitors. These two factors suggest that small firms might have worse 
information environments than their larger brethren.  
                                                 
8 Other related studies use slightly different approaches. While we focus on market-based variables, 
other  studies  give  more  emphasis  to  accounting-based  measures  (Ashbaugh-Skaife  et  al.  2005)  or 
microstructures variables (Kelly 2005).    14 
Lang  and  Lundholm  (1993)  present  several  additional  information-based 
arguments  to  justify  a  positive  association  between  disclosures  and  firm  size, 
measured by market value. Firstly, it is less expensive for larger companies to widely 
disseminate information compared to smaller firms. Secondly, the amount of firm-
specific information available is related to transaction costs. Lower transaction costs 
facilitate reaping benefits from private information and this encourages the search for 
such information  and leads  to  better information environments.  Larger  firms  have 
more liquidity and higher trading volumes, thus transaction costs are on average lower 
for such firms. Thirdly, the amount of information can also be partially explained by 
litigation  cost  theory.  Larger  firms  have  deep-pockets  and  are  thus  are  more 
susceptible to litigation. In order to avoid the costs of litigation, companies tend to 
increase disclosures (Field et al. 2005; Skinner 1994, 1997). Finally, there is a market 
for information and analysts exploit this market, producing and disseminating private 
information. Larger companies attract more investors and, therefore, represent a better 
business opportunity for analysts (Bhushan 1989). All these arguments allow us to 
predict that larger firms should have richer information environments, and as such 
should have lower R²s than their smaller brethren.  
Companies with low book-to-market ratios are valued as growth companies. 
Book-to-market ratios reflect intangible assets and rents which are not shown in the 
balance sheet (AICPA 1994; Eccles et al. 2001; Lev and Zarowin 1999). Whatever the 
cause,  for  companies  with  a  low  book-to-market  ratio  the  market  expects  future 
accounting rates of returns to be higher than in the past. In order to attract capital, 
growth companies have economic incentives to engage in credible reporting practices 
to  align  their  investment  strategies  with  investors‟  interests  (Lambert  et  al.  2005; 
Myers  and  Majluf  1984)  and  have  to  disclose  more  information  to  overcome  the   15 
deficiencies of the financial reporting model. We therefore predict that companies 
with low book-to-market ratios disclose more firm-specific information.  
According to finance theory (Glosten 1987; Glosten and Milgrom 1985), the 
existence of information asymmetries between investors can give rise to an adverse 
selection  problem  and,  consequently,  reduce  liquidity.  Companies  can  avoid  this 
adverse selection cost by reporting more information (Francis et al. 2002; Lambert et 
al. 2005; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000) and more precise information (Diamond and 
Verrecchia 1991; Kim and Verrecchia 1991). Empirical research finds evidence of 
such an association between disclosure strategies and a proxy for adverse selection 
costs – the bid-ask spread (Cohen 2003;  Leuz and Verrecchia 2000). The bid-ask 
spread  theoretically  has  been  divided  into  three  components:  order  processing, 
inventory and adverse selection (George et al. 1991; Glosten 1987; Glosten and Harris 
1988;  Huang  and  Stoll  1997;  Stoll  1989).  For  the  purposes  of  this  study,  we  are 
interested in the adverse selection component, but empirically such decomposition has 
not proven to be reliable or more informative (Affleck-Graves et al. 1994; Brooks 
1994; Lin et al. 1995; McInish and Ness 2002) and so we focus on the bid-ask spread 
itself.
9  We, therefore, predict smaller bid -ask spreads to be associated with less 
information asymmetry and thus with more firm-specific information. Firm size also 
affects the relation between bid-ask spreads and disclosures. Larger companies have 
higher levels of liquidity and, consequently, lower transaction costs and lower bid-ask 
spreads (Easley et al. 1996).  
                                                 
9 An additional reason for not attempting to disaggregate the bid-ask spread is that the order processing 
and inventory holding components are themselves likely to reflect the quality of the firm‟s information 
environment.   16 
Analysts produce and signal information to the market in a way that investors 
believe to be credible and companies  use analysts as a complementary  channel to 
disclose information. These factors provide incentives for firms to try to maximize the 
number of analysts following (Lang and Lundholm 1996). Analysts are in the market 
for information and tend to follow the companies that maximise their (i.e. analysts‟) 
revenues, which can be achieved by focusing on companies with a larger shareholder 
basis, i.e. more potential buyers of information, or on stocks where the quality of the 
analyst service is crucial, i.e. more complex entities. The number of analysts is often 
used  as  a  proxy  for  information  asymmetry  and  the  quality  of  a  company‟s 
information environment. The informational interpretation of R², would suggest that 
higher analyst following should be associated with lower R²s. However, Piotroski and 
Roulstone (2004) argue that more analysts lead to more incorporation of market and 
industry information into prices and, therefore, high analyst following should result in 
higher R²s. Therefore, the prediction of the direction of the relationship remains an 
open question.  
4.  Sample selection and construction of metrics 
Our  sample  comprises  UK  and  US  data  for  the  period  1985-2004.  Both 
capital  markets  are  well  established  and  provide  an  informational  setting  that 
embodies  a  strong  set  of  institutional  factors  designed  to  protect  investors. 
Nevertheless, as stated earlier, Morck et al. (2000) document that the average R² is 
three  times  higher  in  the  UK  than  in  the  USA.  Therefore,  the  use  of  these  two 
countries allows us to explore such differences between the two and potentially to 
draw  more  robust  conclusions  than  if  we  focused  on  countries  with  less  well-  17 
developed capital markets characterised by more heterogeneous investor protection 
environments.  
We identified all listed companies included on Datastream (UK) and CRSP 
(USA) for the period 1985-2004, totalling 5,674 observations for the UK and 21,085 
observations for the USA, including both financial and dead companies. We do not 
consider data before 1985 for two reasons: before this date (i) the number of UK 
companies on the database becomes too small to make reliable inferences regarding 
the  change  in  R²  and  (ii)  data  on  bid-ask  spreads  and  analyst  following  declines 
markedly.  
All companies were included in our samples other than those that failed to 
meet the following criteria. We excluded observations without available information 
(2,009 for the UK) and observations that for a particular year have less than 26 weekly 
observations for returns (31 for the UK and 419 for the USA). We also excluded all 
secondary issues of shares (751 for the USA) in order to focus exclusively on common 
stocks. To measure industry returns, we use the relevant database classification and 
exclude all observations without a valid industry classification (158 for the UK).
10 
Finally, to mitigate the influence of extraneous environmental and governance factors, 
we exclude foreign companies (857 and 1,941, for the UK and  USA respectively).
11 
Our  final  sample  includes  2 ,619  and  17,974  companies,  for  the  UK  and  USA 
respectively. 
                                                 
10 We find that industry composition is stable over time and the proportion in each industry in each 
country is virtually constant. 
11 A company is classified as foreign if it meets one of the following criteria: headquarters outside UK 
or USA; London Stock Exchange or an American stock exchange is not the main stock exchange; or 
the shares were issued outside UK or USA.    18 
Following Roll‟s (1988) methodology, we used a modified market regression 
to  capture  the  level  of  stock  returns  explained  by  market  and  industry  variables. 
Previous research is not unanimous on the inclusion of an industry variable and some 
studies include an additional explanatory variable for US market returns.  
The decision in prior studies to include or not to include an industry variable 
is driven by the focus of the study. Single country or firm-level studies tend to include 
an  industry  variable,  whilst  cross-country  studies  tend  not  to.  We  attribute  this 
difference  to  the  difficulties  of  defining  industries  in  countries  with  small  capital 
markets.
12 The distinction between industry and firm -specific information is a grey 
area and the fewer the firms in  the industry the harder it is to disentangle these two 
categories.  
We have also not included US stock market returns as a market-wide factor 
for UK companies, contrary to certain previous research that includes this variable on 
the basis that most economies are at least partially open to foreign capital (e.g. Morck 
et al. 2000). Our reasons are twofold. First, if it  is used to control the fact that only 
some  companies  have  exposure  to  the  US  economy,  than  this  is  firm -specific 
information. Second, if it attempts to capture the global effect of  the US market then 
this is a market -wide effect (or industry effect if specific to an industry) already 
included in the model.  
Equation  (1)  regresses  company  j’s  returns  (RCjwt)  on  market‟s  returns 
(RMjwt) and industry‟s returns (RIjwt):  
                                                 
12 For instance, the Portuguese market has 76 companies that match our sample selection criteria and 22 
Datastream industry classifications.   19 
jwt jwt jt jwt jt jt jwt RI RM RC           (1) 
All returns are measured on a weekly basis (w) for each year (t). To prevent 
spurious correlations – more severe in industries with fewer companies – market and 
industry  returns  are  value-weighted  averages  excluding  company  j.  We  compute 




































) (   (2) 
where RMjwt (RIjwt) is the market (industry) return in week w of year t, excluding firm 
j, MViwt is company i’s market value and n is the number of companies in the market 
(industry). RCiwt is company i‟s returns in week w of year t. We use weekly data to 
mitigate thin trading problems. 
Equation (1) yields a R
2 value per company-year that has been interpreted as 
an inverse proxy for firm-specific information (Morck et al. 2000). A large R
2 implies 
that the market and the industry explain a large proportion of the company‟s returns. 
Conversely,  a  small  R
2  means  that  such  pervasive  factors  poorly  explain  the 
company‟s returns and, therefore, there are other factors not common to market or 
industry driving  the measure.  We also  compute an  annual  R² value  for the entire 
sample (country) by weighting individual R




















2   (3)   20 
where SST is the total sum of squares of the regression.  
In our tests we use the logistic transformation of R
















LTRSQ   (4)  
The use of the logistic transformation of R² is justified by R² being bounded 
between zero and one (Atkinson 1985). It behaves in the opposite direction to the 
usually used  raw R² measure:  a high R² leads  to a lower  LTRSQ  and  vice versa. 
Therefore,  whereas  previously  lower  levels  of  R²  are  supposedly  associated  with 
better  information  environments,  after  the  transformation,  LTRSQ  has  a  positive 
relationship with the quality of information environment.  
Finally,  we  construct  a  yearly  bid-ask  spread,  using  Equation  (5)  below, 
where BASjt is the bid-ask spread for company j in year t. ASKjwt (BIDjwt) is the ask 
(bid) price for company j in week w of year t (e.g. Cohen 2003; Greenstein 1994). 
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In  our  study,  we  use  two  approaches  to  capture  the  effect  of  analyst 
following.  Firstly,  we  take  into  account  the  total  number  of  analysts  following  a 
specific company during each year. Secondly, we set a dummy variable equal to one if 
the number of analysts following a company is greater than or equal to the industry 
average and set it equal to zero if not. 
All  information  was  obtained  directly  from  Datastream  (UK)  and  CRSP 
(USA) except data on analyst following that were gathered from IBES. Bid-ask spread   21 
data are not available before 1986. When constructing the book-to-market ratio we 
deleted  observations  with  negative  book  values.  For  the  USA,  book  value  was 
obtained from Compustat. Analyst following for each firm-year is measured by the 
number of forecasts in IBES by different analysts during the year and is merged with 
Datastream and CRSP data. If a company exists in Datastream and CRSP but we 
failed to match it to an IBES company, we assume the company is not being tracked 
and set the number of analysts following it to zero. 
For  some  of  these  information-related  variables,  there  is  no  information 
available  for  the  complete  period  and  so  company  coverage  is  not  identical.  We 
therefore adjust our sample depending on the years and variables used and we report 
these adjustments.  
In order to carry out some further exploratory and sensitivity analyses we 
used the analysts‟ forecasts standard deviation provided by IBES. However, we found 
there were only a relatively small number of observations for the UK. The use of IBES 
summary statistics might introduce some survivorship bias. Thus we only use this data 
in  some  exploratory  analyses  and,  therefore,  care  should  be  exercised  when 
generalizing the results. 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the weighted average country-based annual 
R² for the last 20 years. Such R²s for the UK are higher for the first half of the period 
and slowly decline over time. After 1995, the two countries have similar R²s. The 
most  striking  features  are  two  spikes  in  1987  and  2000-2001,  the  former 
corresponding to the stock market crash of 1987 and the latter to the hi-tech bubble 
and its subsequent bursting.    22 
During the crash of 1987, R² reached maxima of 26% and 18% in the UK and 
USA, respectively. Figure 2 shows that, although there was an increase in the firm-
specific component, this large spike was also associated with an increase in pervasive 
factors. Another characteristic of the crash  of 1987 is  that R² and its  components 
immediately returned to values similar to those prior to the crash. A similar effect has 
been observed in the US market by Campbell et al. (2001) regarding changes through 
time in firm-specific volatility. This type of behaviour is at odds with the explanations 
given by Morck et al. (2000). Corporate governance and investor protection rights do 
not change so quickly and so dramatically and neither do firms‟ fundamentals.  
   23 
Table 1 and Table 2 present descriptive statistics
13 for the pooled time-series-
and-cross-sectional samples. In  
                                                 
13  Descriptive  statistics  show  the  existence  of  some  potential  outliers,  we  run  our  analyses  with  a 
sample where the outliers are removed and results are not affected.    24 
Table  1,  we  can  see  that  apart  from  the  effects  of  market  value  and  the 
number  of  observations,  the  other  variables  have  broadly  similar  distribution 
characteristics in both countries.  
Table 2 shows that the bid-ask spread variable behaves quite differently over 
time in the two countries. In the USA, the bid-ask spread has been declining for the 
last 20 years. On the other hand, in the UK, the bid-ask spread presents an increasing 
trend, from a minimum of 0.02 (1986, 1987 and 1989) to a maximum of 0.15 (2002-
2003). This pattern is inconsistent with an informational interpretation of R² and its 
components. Work by Amihud and Mendelson (2003) in the USA suggest that the 
order processing and inventory components of bid-ask spread are decreasing over time 
and that secular increases in bid-ask spreads must be due to the adverse selection 
component that arises from information asymmetry between investors.  
The book-to-market ratio varies over the period examined, with no pattern 
evident.  It is worth noting that the book-to-market ratio seems to increase around 
major stock markets crash, however the different pattern shown for both countries 
does not have a straightforward explanation. 
The number of companies being followed by analysts increases over time, 
reaching the maximum in 1998 (1,106 for the UK and 4,494 for the USA) and then 
decreases. In our models, we lagged our measure of analysts per firm by one year to 
reflect the effect of the number of analysts before its informational effect is reflected 
in R²s and because analysts need to have been following a company for a while before 
reporting forecasts for it.  
Table  3  reports  Pearson  and  Spearman‟s  correlation  coefficients  for  all 
variables  used  in  the  multivariate  analysis.  The  correlation  between  R²  and  all   25 
individual  information-related  variables  is  inconsistent  with  an  information 
interpretation of R². It indicates that those companies which are smaller, have larger 
bid-ask spreads, higher book-to-market ratios and fewer analysts following them have 
lower R²s. 
5.  Empirical tests and discussion of results 
5.1. The  relationship  between  R²  and  information-related 
variables 
Theory discussed earlier predicts a positive association between firm size, 
analyst following and the amount of firm-specific information. It predicts a negative 
association between the degree of information asymmetries, book-to-market ratio and 
the amount of firm-specific information. In this section, we will analyse the reliability 
of the R² methodology by using a set of regressions that aim at testing the relationship 
between  R²-based  measures  and  a  vector  of  firm-specific  attributes  related  to  the 
quality  of  the  information  environment.  All  results  are  reported  using  the 
Fama-Macbeth procedure (Campbell et al. 1997)
14. 
In our first set of tests, w e use the Logistic Transformation of R² ( LTRSQ), 
Equation (4), and the raw R², for comparison purposes, as dependent variables. Our 
analysis will focus mainly on the LTRSQ, due to the statistical problems associated 
                                                 
14 Initial regressions are run using Equation (1) and the R² (and other relevant information) per firm-
year from each regression is recorded and used as the dependent variable in a second set of yearly 
regressions where our set of information-related variables are used as explanatory variables. From this 
second  regression,  we  obtain  a  time  series  set  of  coefficient estimates  and  t-statistics 
for each explanatory variable, and  a  time-series  set  of annual R²s.  Mean  coefficients  and  R²s  are 
reported along side Fama-Macbeth t-statistics, which are computed based on the standard deviation 
from the time series set of t-statistics and are used to evaluate significance.   26 
with bounded variables, as mentioned earlier in the paper. Our first set of regressions 
analyses  the  relationship  between  our  dependent  variables  and  the  information-set 
attributes: market value (MV), bid-ask spread (BAS), number of analysts following 
(ANL)
15  and  book-to-market  ratio  (BM).  Note  that,  as  discussed  earlier,  our 
hypothesised directions are opposite for R
2 and LTRSQ, and LTRSQ is expected to 
have a positive relationship with the quality of the information environment. Table 4 
shows that LTRSQ is negatively associated with MV in both countries, indicating that 
larger companies co-move more with the market. This result is not consistent with the 
hypothesis that larger companies have better information environments. The result is 
consistent, however, with larger companies being more highly diversified than smaller 
ones.
16  
We also hypothesise  that better firm-specific information environments  are 
positively correlated  to  smaller  bid-ask spreads. However we do not observe this 
relationship. In fact,  Table 4 shows that for the UK, larger  BAS are associated with 
higher levels of LTRSQ and lower levels of R². For the US results are statistically 
insignificant and, therefore, also do not confirm our predictions. Again, this is hard to 
reconcile with Morck et al.‟s (2000) interpretation of R². One can argue that BAS also 
reflects the issues associated to liquidity, but as we argued earlier in the paper even if 
this is the case, liquidity would also be associated with information and the prediction 
remains unchanged. 
                                                 
15 We also run the same set of regressions again using a dummy to control for analysts coverage above 
or below industry‟s average and results are similar. 
16 The raw R² regression has a similar interpretation though the coefficient is of the opposite sign.   27 
The sign on the ANL coefficient is negative in both countries in the LTRSQ 
regression. Analyst following is clearly a measure of information and results are once 
again incompatible with an informational interpretation of the R² methodology. An 
alternative explanation could be that analysts capture industry information and that 
their actions lead to more co-movement. We will return to this issue later on in the 
paper.  
Finally, a low book-to-market ratio is an indicator of firms with high growth 
prospects. Such firms have strong economic incentives to provide the market with 
firm-specific information. This leads us to the understanding that there would be a 
negative relationship between LTRSQ and BM. Table 4 confirms this relationship for 
the  UK  and  confirms  a  similar  effect  for  the  US  but  is  of  weaker  statistical 
significance.  Results  on  BM  provide  limited  support  for  Morck  et  al‟s.  (2000) 
interpretation of R². One should however be aware that from our vector of explanatory 
variables, BM is also the one that, as discussed earlier, has greater diversity of view in 
what it represents concerning what it reflects.  
Results from Table 4 strongly suggest that the expected relationship between 
the  R²  overall  measure  of  the  quality  of  the  information  environment  and  other 
information-related variables cannot be supported on the basis of the informational 
perspective proposed by Morck et al. (2000) and subsequent studies. Our results are 
fully consistent with and complementary to the empirical findings of Ashbaugh-Skaife 
et al. (2005) and Kelly (2005) and the theoretical arguments of Shiller (1981) and 
West (1988) concerning. higher levels of stock returns volatility which is unrelated to 
changes in fundamentals. Moreover, as discussed earlier in the paper, by construction, 
the R² methodology captures changes in returns and not changes in fundamentals. 
Poor information environments are more likely to facilitate uninformed trading and,   28 
therefore, smaller firms, higher bid-ask spreads, less analyst following or lower book-
to-market ratios are more likely to present higher stock returns and higher levels of 
uninformed trading. Our results are not inconsistent with this alternative explanation 
of R² being driven by uninformed trading and that more information leads to less firm-
specific variability and, therefore, higher R². 
5.2. The R² components 
Morck  et  al.  (2000)  also  propose  a  breakdown  of  R²  with  the  aim  of 
disentangling firm-specific effects and pervasive factors. This breakdown is presented 
as  a  more  refined  technique  to  capture  firm-specific  information  and  it  has  been 
adopted in subsequent research (e.g. Durnev et al. 2001). The proposed breakdown 
interprets R² as the returns variation explained by the model (market and industry) 
relative to total variation. R
2 is then the proportion of the regression sum of squares 
(SSR) to the total sum of squares (SST), which is in turn the sum of SSR and the sum of 
squared  errors  (SSE).  SSR  is  the  difference  between  the  estimated  value  and  the 
average – in other words, the part the regression model can explain. SSE reflects what 
is left unexplained by the model, the difference between the observed value and the 
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The breakdown proposed by Morck et al. (2000) is particularly relevant when 
applied to the logistic transformation of R² as it allows an additive breakdown of the 




































  (7) 
Under  this  interpretation,  changes  in  LTRSQ  result  from  the  interaction 
between firm-specific and pervasive factors. We interpret LTRSQ as the relevance of 
firm-specific information relative to market-wide information. Equation (7) shows that 
higher LTRSQ results when the firm-specific factor is more important relative to the 
market-wide factors. Equation (4) allows us to separate the two components and to use 
them individually in multivariate tests. LSSE is used as a measure of firm-specific 
information and the next set of tests extend our analyses to this component together 
with  the  LSSR.  As  there  is  general  agreement  in  the  literature  concerning  the 
determinants of pervasive LSSR factors, we focus the following discussion primarily 
on the LSSE results.  
Contrary  to  what  prior  research  on  the  behaviour  of  the  information 
environment  measures  would  lead  us  to  hypothesise,  Table  5  shows  that  LSSE  is 
significantly and negatively associated with MV in both countries. Results on LSSR 
seem to suggest that larger firms co-move more with the market, these results are not 
consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that  larger  companies  have  better  information 
environments, however it is consistent with the idea that larger companies are more 
highly diversified than smaller ones; in which case, we would expect the pervasive 
factor (LSSR) to be positively related to firm size, and this is what we observe in the   30 
UK.
17. Results on this are hard to reconcile with Morck et al.‟s (2000) interpretation of 
R².  
The sign on ANL is positive in the LSSE regression, which is consistent with 
the  argument  that  the  greater  the  analyst  following,  the  better  the  information 
environment. It is difficult to form a clear prediction regarding the sign of the ANL 
coefficient in the LSSR regression. On the one hand, analysts are a source of firm-
specific information; in which case, we would expect ANL not to be significant in the 
LSSR regression. On the other hand, analysts are also  a source of information on 
general economic and industry related news (Piotroski and Roulstone 2004). Analyst 
following is also likely to be related to firm size. Either or both of these two factors 
would lead us to predict a positive sign on ANL in the LSSR regressions, which is what 
Table 5 reveals. Since LTRSQ = LSSE - LSSR, it follows that the pervasive factor 
(LSSR) is the dominant component in explaining the LTRSQ regression results. Again, 
this is not consistent with Morck et al‟s. (2000) informational interpretation of R². 
Finally, we predict a negative relationship between LSSE and BM. Table 5 
indicates that this relationship is of weak statistical significance. In terms of pervasive 
factors, the greater opaqueness (and hence greater riskiness) of low-BM firms should 
result in them having greater co-movement with the market. On the other hand, this 
relationship  will  be  attenuated  by  the  fact  that  high-BM  firms  are  not  as  well 
diversified. We therefore predict a weak positive relationship between LSSR and BM. 
However, it can be seen from Table 5 that the coefficient on BM is insignificant. 
Again, Morck et al‟s. (2000) informational interpretation does not hold. 
                                                 
17 It should be noted that, the MV coefficient in LSSR regression for the USA is not significant – a 
finding consistent with Roll (1988). We conjecture that the difference between the two countries is 
attributable to the greater size of the US economy.    31 
We also tested several interactions, using different variable combinations, but 
we found these interactions to provide little additional contribution. For presentation 
reasons we present here only the results from interacting the variables MV and BAS. 
Table  6  shows  that  the  coefficient  of  BAS  is  sensitive  to  the  inclusion  of  the 
interaction variable. When using LTRSQ as the dependent variable the coefficient for 
BAS becomes negative for the UK and statistically insignificant for the US. The same 
effect is not visible when using LSSE as the dependent variable. In all of the cases the 
coefficient of the interaction term is positive meaning that as size increases, larger 
BAS  are  associated  with  better  information.  This  is  not  compatible  with  an 
informational interpretation. 
5.3. R² and analysts forecast dispersion 
Our next set of tests is only exploratory because of lack of data availability: 
we  include  an  additional  variable  in  our  regressions  that  should  be  undeniably 
associated  with  the  firm-specific  information  environment.  If  the  information 
environment is of a good quality it should facilitate predictions and forecasts: in such 
a scenario, analysts should arrive at similar forecasts of future earnings. We use the 
standard deviation of analyst forecasts (IBSTD) as an inverse measure of the quality of 
the information environment. We do not include this variable in our main set of tests 
due to lack of data
18.  
In Table 7, we focus our analysis on the two dependent variables which prior 
research claims to measure firm-specific information (LTRSQ and LSSE) and we can 
                                                 
18 According to IBES and WRDS these data are only available for a subset of companies and to some 
extent it is affected by survivorship bias. As survivorship might itself be correlated with the quality of 
the information environment, any relationship with IBSTD has to be treated with caution.   32 
see that the inclusion of such an analyst variable leads to some changes in the results, 
namely some of the unlikely relationships cease to be statistically significant. The 
counter intuitive sign of MV (for the UK when using LSSE) and BAS (when using 
LTRSQ  as  the  dependent  variable)  are  not  significant  anymore,  however  these 
relationships  are  still  highly  significant  in  the  remaining  regressions.  BM  is  now 
always negative and statistically significant, except for LTRSQ in the US. However, 
far more interesting is that in all of the cases except for LTRSQ in the UK, IBSTD is 
positively associated with the dependent variables. The caution in footnote 18 noted, 
the coefficients on IBSTD seem to give some support to the argument that R² captures 
uninformed trading rather than information. In other words, lower R²s reflect more 
unstable  information  environments,  raising  some  doubts  over  the  informational 
interpretation of R².  
5.4. Sensitivity analyses 
5.4.1. Extreme returns 
As stated earlier, we do not delete extreme weekly observations, though this 
has been a normal procedure in all similar studies, usually with the justification that 
there are likely to be data errors (Morck et al. 2000, 224): “On the assumption that 
coding  errors  are  overrepresented  in  extreme  observations,  we  trim  our  data  by 
dropping bi-weekly observations for which the stock's return exceeds 0.25 in absolute 
value”. 
For  the  UK,  we  examined  such  “outliers”  and,  hand  checked  each  with 
source data: we found that virtually none of them could be considered as an error. Our 
procedure was twofold. Firstly, we randomly selected a sample of UK extreme weekly   33 
returns and checked for changes in price to confirm that true price variation existed. 
Secondly,  for  all  observations  with  weekly  returns  above  200%
19  we checked for 
information  events registered in the database  Perfect  Information during the same 
week.  As  reported  in  Table  8,  in  84%
20  of these cases information was actually 
released. Our analysis dismisses the error justification and  on the contrary it strongly 
signals  that  such outliers  might  be  crucial  to  any  information -related  study.  By 
ignoring such observations, previous research restricts the validity of its conclusions. 
These extreme returns can be both noise and the result of info rmation events. If the 
extreme returns result from information events, then its inclusion  in the analysis is 
relevant for the research question.  
We include such extreme observations in our sample, which we consider a 
major contribution towards our study. Nevertheless, we also replicate the exclusion 
practiced in other studies and it results in a significant reduction in the variation in the 
components of R². Due to the number of observations, it would be a much larger task 
to perform such a check of extreme observations on the US market. 
Figure 3, in contrast to Figure 2, presents the evolution of the components of 
R² for the UK after deleting weekly returns larger than ± 25% , the basis used in 
previous studies. We note a strong decline in the firm-specific component (SSE). The 
magnitude  of  pervasive  factors  (SSR)  also  declines,  but  not  as  severely  as  firm-
                                                 
19 Previous research considered bi-weekly returns larger than ±25% to be errors. In our analysis, by 
selecting weekly returns above 200% we are selecting the ones where the likelihood of error is most 
extreme.  
20 For the remaining 16% we do not have any evidence concerning the release (or non -release) of 
information.    34 
specific ones.
21 We believe that this specification as used in previous  studies is a 
mistaken one for the reasons discussed above.  
Trimming the sample at ± 25% deletes observations with abnormal behaviour 
and forces the model to perform in a more “desirable” way. Volatility is trimmed and 
any eventual noise effect reduced, inadvertently sharpening the results inappropriately 
to  appear  to  be  more  consistent  with  an  informational  perspective  of  the  R² 
methodology.  
We also run our multivariate analysis excluding extreme returns, consistent 
with Morck et al. (2000) and other papers, and our results are consistent with the ones 
reported without the exclusions in this paper. R² and its components still behave in the 
opposite way to an informational interpretation. 
5.4.2. Non-trading weeks 
Periods where no trading activity has occurred have a zero return, which will 
not only affect market and industry returns for the period, but also affect the degree of 
co-movement. To test for the impact of no trading, we eliminated observations that 
corresponded to periods larger than two weeks in duration with no trading activity. 
Such deletions do not significantly affect our interpretation of the results.  
5.4.3. Industry effects 
As  we  mentioned  earlier,  previous  research  using  R²  methodology  is  not 
unanimous on the inclusion of an industry factor. Roll (1988) began by using only a 
                                                 
21 In addition in another test we also trimmed our sample for weekly returns larger than 100%, and the 
results are similar but less pronounced.   35 
market  index  and  then  extended  the  model  to  include  an  industry  variable,  but 
subsequent research does not address this issue conceptually. Therefore, we replicate 
our multivariate tests using the LTRSQ, LSSR and LSSE from a modified version of 
Equation  (1)  without an industry  factor. Equation  (8) uses only market  returns as 
independent variable.  
jwt jwt jt jt jwt RM RC         (8)  
Figure 4 compares the R² with and without the industry variable. When using 
the  model  without  the  industry  variable  we  constructed  an  alternative  sample 
including  all  companies  with  invalid  industry  classification,  which  could  not  be 
included in the model used earlier. Multivariate results are very similar to those in 
Table 4 and Table 5, allowing us to draw analogous conclusions.  
In the main tests, in order to take into account that small industries are more 
likely to be sensitive to extreme observations we constructed the industry index for 
each company excluding the company in question, as described in Equation (2). As a 
further sensitivity test, we also deleted from our final sample companies in industries 
with less than ten companies and the results remain unaffected.  
Companies  listed  on  the  London  Stock  Exchange  are  industry  classified 
according  to  the  FTSE  Global  Classification.  In  our  main  tests,  we  adopt  a 
classification by level four sectors/industries. As a sensitivity analysis, we also rerun 
our tests with different levels of classification. Results are not affected by this. 
5.4.4. Using market value as a weighting factor 
Equation (3) uses SST as a weighting factor to compute an aggregate R² per 
year. The use of SST allows us to decompose the aggregate R² into its components as 
in Equation (4). As a sensitivity test, we also run our tests using market value as a   36 
weighting  factor  for  R²  rather  than  SST  and  results  show  a  strong  and  positive 
association  with  market  value.  When  using  market  value  as  the  weighting  factor 
instead of SST, the declining trend disappears and annual R²s are considerably higher. 
This effect shows a clear positive association between R² and market value, as we 
discussed in our multivariate analysis. 
6.  Conclusions 
Roll (1988) establishes a research methodology that attempts to investigate 
the  performance  of  asset  pricing  theory.  The  coherent  results  from  this  stream  of 
research  demonstrate  how  poorly  asset  pricing  theories  perform  when  trying  to 
explain  returns.  A  more  recent  stream  of  research  uses  the  same  methodology  to 
measure  the  cross-country  quality  of  information  environments.  In  this  paper,  we 
question the conclusions of such research, applied at a firm rather than a cross-country 
level,  particularly  its  interpretation  of  the  R²  measure  as  a  proxy  for  quality  of 
information.  
We study the behaviour of the methodology at the firm-level, based on R² 
and  its  components,  in  two  developed  countries  over  the  last  twenty  years  and 
examine  its  relationship  with  other  information-related  variables  which  capture 
aspects of the information environment. We focus on the firm-level because in cross-
country results, such an effect might not be evident because it can easily be obscured 
by institutional factors. Our results lead us to question the accepted rationales for the 
use  of  such  R²  methodology  articulated  in  recent  research  and  indicate  that  other 
factors rather than information may be driving R². We believe that the informational 
interpretation of the R² methodology proposed in the literature has flaws that need to   37 
be carefully considered by researchers intending to use it as a parsimonious way of 
representing the quality of a firm‟s information environment.    38 
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics for average of unadjusted variables for the whole 
period 
Panel A:  United Kingdom
N Mean Std dev Min 25% Median 75% Max
R² 1,388 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.19 0.79
LTRSQ 1,388 2.51 1.49 -1.40 1.52 2.39 3.36 9.54
Analysts per firm 814 8 8 1 2 5 10 46
Companies followed by analysts 814 814 187 460 664 834 953 1,106
Bid-ask spread (BAS) 1,224 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.07 1.41
Book-to-market (BM) 1,159 0.89 1.49 0.00 0.33 0.61 1.07 32.60
Market value (MV million £) 1,388 530 2,725 0 9 33 146 50,155
Market returns (sample-year) 20 0.13 0.16 -0.25 0.08 0.18 0.22 0.34
FTSE all returns (year) 20 0.13 0.16 -0.23 0.05 0.18 0.24 0.36
Panel B: United States of America
N Mean Std dev Min 25% Median 75% Max
R² 6,621 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.19 0.87
LTRSQ 6,621 2.55 1.48 -2.23 1.55 2.41 3.39 12.10
Analysts per firm 3,287 9 10 1 2 6 12 67
Companies followed by analysts 3,287 3,287 668 2,362 2,791 3,100 3,802 4,494
Bid-ask spread (BAS) 6,621 0.07 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.08 1.08
Book-to-market (BM) 4,521 0.83 1.80 0.00 0.23 0.51 0.93 70.62
Market value (MV million £) 6,293 1,185 6,628 0 27 99 416 204,023
Market returns (sample-year) 20 0.13 0.17 -0.20 -0.02 0.12 0.27 0.39
AMEX, NASDAQ and NYSE returns 20 0.14 0.17 -0.21 0.01 0.17 0.29 0.36 
R² is computed using Equation (1) and then transformed to LTRSQ with Equation (4).  
Bid-ask spreads are computed using Equation (5).  
Market  returns  are  market  value  weighted.  For  each  company  we  computed  annual  returns  using 
weekly observations and annual average market value. 
Book-to-market ratio is computed by dividing book value of equity by market value. 






Table 2 – Descriptive statistics for unadjusted variables – Averages for individual years 
Panel A:  United Kingdom
85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04
Nr of companies 821 885 970 1,075 1,148 1,202 1,227 1,251 1,310 1,438 1,526 1,674 1,786 1,785 1,659 1,625 1,657 1,663 1,562 1,504
R² 0.12 0.15 0.34 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.11 0.15 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.17 0.11 0.12 0.09
LTRSQ 2.62 2.29 0.85 2.17 1.95 2.23 2.19 2.32 2.79 2.31 3.10 3.05 3.11 2.58 3.07 2.94 2.08 2.83 2.78 3.20
Analysts per firm 5 7 7 6 6 6 10 7 11 10 9 8 7 7 7 7 7
Companies followed by analysts 460 580 611 596 664 714 762 813 906 992 1,106 1,075 967 953 934 864 834
Bid-ask spread (BAS) 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.11
Book-to-market (BM) 0.92 0.80 0.85 0.82 0.82 0.81 1.11 1.07 1.29 0.81 0.84 0.82 0.70 0.75 1.00 0.85 0.84 0.95 1.04 0.79
Market value (MV million £) 172 202 245 246 261 336 299 357 407 512 447 492 565 677 807 1,046 1,054 897 710 870
Market returns (sample-year) 0.20 0.25 0.11 0.10 0.34 -0.09 0.19 0.17 0.32 -0.07 0.22 0.14 0.22 0.13 0.26 0.03 -0.11 -0.25 0.19 0.23
FTSE all returns (year) 0.19 0.27 0.08 0.12 0.36 -0.10 0.21 0.20 0.28 -0.06 0.24 0.17 0.24 0.14 0.24 -0.06 -0.13 -0.23 0.21 0.13
Panel B:  United States of America
85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04
Nr of companies 5,828 6,003 6,465 6,439 6,215 6,161 6,041 6,251 6,551 7,237 7,361 7,820 8,034 7,917 7,348 7,137 6,520 6,006 5,594 5,495
R² 0.11 0.12 0.22 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.16 0.09 0.15 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.21
LTRSQ 2.71 2.57 1.68 2.98 2.95 2.52 2.69 2.99 2.97 2.74 3.06 2.91 2.88 2.14 2.98 2.29 1.85 2.25 2.11 1.79
Analysts per firm 11 11 12 10 10 11 9 8 8 9 9 8 8 8 8 9 9 10 10 10
Companies followed by analysts 2,362 2,444 2,643 2,846 2,751 2,802 2,805 2,756 2,942 3,287 3,652 3,798 4,332 4,494 4,358 4,124 3,814 3,331 3,180 3,019
Bid-ask spread (BAS) 0.08 0.17 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02
Book-to-market (BM) 0.92 0.87 1.05 0.98 1.05 1.11 0.99 0.89 0.75 0.78 0.69 0.68 0.67 0.89 0.87 1.12 1.05 0.98 0.64 0.53
Market value (MV million £) 374 414 376 414 520 473 644 694 736 673 891 1,031 1,330 1,693 2,246 2,160 2,089 1,754 2,447 2,745
Market returns (sample-year) 0.25 0.12 -0.01 0.12 0.24 -0.04 0.39 0.04 0.11 -0.04 0.32 0.16 0.28 0.28 0.27 -0.09 -0.10 -0.20 0.35 0.12
AMEX, NASDAQ and NYSE returns 0.31 0.16 0.02 0.18 0.28 -0.06 0.34 0.09 0.12 -0.01 0.36 0.21 0.30 0.22 0.26 -0.11 -0.11 -0.21 0.33 0.13  
R² is computed using Equation (1) and then transformed to LTRSQ with Equation (4).  
Bid-ask spreads are computed using Equation (5).  
Market returns are market value weighted. For each company we computed annual returns using weekly observations and annual average market value. 
Book-to-market ratio is computed by dividing book value of equity by market value. 
The information about analysts refers only to companies with at least one analyst following.  The R² puzzle 
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Table 3 – Pearson/Spearman correlation coefficients 
Panel A: United Kingdom
R² LTRSQ ANL BAS BM MV
R² -0.84 0.25 -0.19 -0.07 0.56
LTRSQ -1.00 -0.24 0.19 0.09 -0.48
ANL 0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.08 0.51
BAS -0.49 0.49 -0.42 0.06 -0.39
BM -0.11 0.11 -0.12 0.23 -0.23
MV 0.48 -0.48 0.50 -0.83 -0.33
Panel B: United States of America
R² LTRSQ ANL BAS BM MV
R² -0.84 0.41 -0.18 -0.06 0.50
LTRSQ -1.00 -0.34 0.19 0.06 -0.46
ANL 0.32 -0.32 -0.18 -0.05 0.61
BAS -0.35 0.35 -0.37 0.09 -0.43
BM -0.12 0.12 -0.08 0.21 -0.20
MV 0.49 -0.49 0.58 -0.68 -0.37  
Upper and lower diagonals present Pearson and Spearman‟s correlation 
coefficients, respectively.  
LTRSQ is the Logistic Transformation of R² as in Equation (4). Firm 
size  is  measured  as  the  natural  logarithm  of  market  value  (MV). 
Information  asymmetry  is  measured  by  the  bid-ask  spread  (BAS) 
computed  as  in  Equation  (5).  ANL  number  measures  the  number  of 







Table 4 – Regression results LTRSQ and R² (UK and USA) 
t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j BM ANL BAS MV DV , , , , 4 , , , 3 , , , 2 , , , 1 , ,              
R²}   {LTRSQ,     DV   
Intercept ? 3.92 ? -0.05 ? 4.08 ? -0.03
(22.61) (-4.23) (35.43) (-2.58)
MV + -0.38 - 0.05 + -0.32 - 0.03
(-26.19) (15.60) (-21.79) (12.65)
BAS - 1.82 + -0.08 - 0.14 + 0.03
(2.00) (-0.76) (0.92) (1.84)
ANL + -0.01 - 0.00 + -0.01 - 0.00
(-3.82) (1.70) (-6.95) (10.88)
BM - -0.02 + 0.01 - -0.01 + 0.00
(-2.09) (3.08) (-1.91) (1.52)
R² 0.31 0.40 0.27 0.34
Adjusted R² 0.30 0.40 0.27 0.34
Number of companies (average) 1,170 1,170 4,331 4,331
Number of years 17 17 20 20
United Kingdom United States of America
LTRSQ R² LTRSQ R²
 
R² is computed using Equation (1) and LTRSQ is the Logistic Transformation of R² as in Equation (4). Firm size 
is measured as the natural logarithm of market value (MV). Information asymmetry is measured by the bid-ask 
spread (BAS) computed as in Equation (5). ANL number measures the number of analysts following a company. 
BM is the book-to-market ratio.  
Results are reported using Fama-MacBeth type regressions. The mean coefficients of all annual regressions are 
reported. Fama-MacBeth time series t-statistics are in parentheses. Coefficients which are significant at least at 





Table 5 – Regression results using LSSE and LSSR (UK and USA) 
t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j BM ANL BAS MV DV , , , , 4 , , , 3 , , , 2 , , , 1 , ,              
LSSR}   {LSSE,     DV   
Intercept ? -2.37 ? -6.28 ? -0.16 ? -4.24
(-14.54) (-32.81) (-1.57) (-32.93)
MV + -0.10 - 0.27 + -0.32 - 0.00
(-5.48) (12.29) (-23.38) (0.05)
BAS - 6.35 + 4.53 - 1.18 + 1.04
(4.34) (4.23) (8.25) (4.31)
ANL + 0.01 - 0.02 + 0.01 - 0.02
(2.66) (3.39) (5.27) (9.38)
BM - -0.01 + 0.01 - -0.04 + -0.02
(-1.59) (0.76) (-1.88) (-1.47)
R² 0.21 0.12 0.30 0.03
Adjusted R² 0.21 0.12 0.30 0.03
Number of companies (average) 1,170 1,170 4,331 4,331
Number of years 17 17 20 20
United Kingdom United States of America
LSSE LSSR LSSE LSSR
 
LSSE and LSSR are based on Equation (7). Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of market value (MV). 
Information asymmetry is measured by the bid-ask spread (BAS) computed as in Equation (5). ANL number 
measures the number of analysts following a company. BM is the book-to-market ratio.  
Results are reported using Fama-MacBeth type regressions. The mean coefficients of all annual regressions are 
reported. Fama-MacBeth time series t-statistics are in parentheses. Coefficients which are significant at least at 




Table 6 – Regression results with the interaction of MV and BAS (UK and USA) 
t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j BAS MV BM ANL BAS MV DV , , , , , 5 , , , 4 , , , 3 , , , 2 , , , 1 , , *                
LSSE}   {LTRSQ,     DV   
Intercept ? 4.01 ? -2.33 ? 4.13 ? -0.19
(25.98) (-12.93) (34.06) (-2.10)
MV + -0.40 + -0.12 + -0.34 + -0.32
(-29.64) (-6.82) (-23.25) (-21.34)
BAS - -2.30 - 3.50 - -0.47 - 2.07
(-4.23) (4.07) (-1.16) (4.91)
ANL + -0.01 + 0.01 + -0.01 + 0.01
(-3.07) (3.14) (-6.95) (5.53)
BM - -0.01 - -0.04 - -0.01 - -0.03
(-1.75) (-2.51) (-1.82) (-2.15)
MV * BAS ? 1.65 ? 1.34 ? 0.25 ? -0.14
(5.38) (4.39) (3.02) (-1.17)
R² 0.32 0.23 0.27 0.30
Adjusted R² 0.31 0.23 0.27 0.30
Number of companies (average) 1,170 1,170 4,331 4,331
Number of years 17 17 20 20
LTRSQ LSSE
United Kingdom United States of America
LTRSQ LSSE
 
LTRSQ is the Logistic Transformation of R² as in Equation (4) and LSSE is based on Equation (7). Firm size is 
measured as the natural logarithm of market value (MV). Information asymmetry is measured by the bid-ask 
spread (BAS) computed as in Equation (5). ANL number measures the number of analysts following a company. 
BM is the book-to-market ratio.  
Results are reported using Fama-MacBeth type regressions. The mean coefficients of all annual regressions are 
reported. Fama-MacBeth time series t-statistics are in parentheses. Coefficients which are significant at least at 




Table 7 – Regression results including Standard Deviation of IBES Analyst Forecasts (UK and USA) 
t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j t j IBSTD BM ANL BAS MV DV , , , , 5 , , , 4 , , , 3 , , , 2 , , , 1 , ,                
LSSE}   {LTRSQ,     DV   
Intercept ? -4.24 ? -3.06 ? 3.86 ? 0.05
(15.03) (-17.21) (23.80) (0.29)
MV + -0.42 + -0.02 + -0.30 + -0.33
(-15.87) (-1.43) (-20.78) (-12.82)
BAS - 4.11 - 16.72 - 0.19 - 1.01
(1.88) (12.97) (1.02) (4.78)
ANL + -0.01 + 0.01 + -0.01 + 0.01
(-2.03) (2.25) (-5.25) (2.45)
BM - -0.14 - -0.10 - -0.03 - -0.15
(-3.71) (-2.38) (-1.02) (-3.83)
IBSTD - 0.00 - 0.01 - 0.01 - 0.02
(1.21) (3.90) (2.28) (4.10)
R² 0.33 0.29 0.27 0.31
Adjusted R² 0.33 0.28 0.27 0.31
Number of companies (average) 535 535 2,260 2,260
Number of years 17 17 20 20
United Kingdom United States of America
LTRSQ LSSE LTRSQ LSSE
 
LTRSQ is the Logistic Transformation of R² as in Equation (4) and LSSE is based on Equation (7). Firm size is 
measured as the natural logarithm of market value (MV). Information asymmetry is measured by the bid-ask 
spread (BAS) computed as in Equation (5). ANL number measures the number of analysts following a company. 
BM  is  the  book-to-market  ratio.  Results  are  reported  using  Fama-MacBeth  type  regressions.  The  mean 
coefficients of all annual regressions are reported. Fama-MacBeth time series t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Coefficients which are significant at least at a 5% level are in bold. Hypothesised directions are indicated. 
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Table 8 – Relationship between extreme weekly returns and information releases 
(UK) 
 
Without information releases 11 16%
With information releases 58 84%
69 100%
Financial statements 14 24%
Shareholder structure 21 36%
Trading situation 11 19%
Mergers and acquisitions 9 16%
New products 3 5%
58 100%
Panel A: Overall relationship of extreme returns
Panel B: Types of announcements for companies with releases
 
Extreme  returns  are  classified  as  weekly  returns  above  200%.  Previous 
research  considers  bi-weekly  returns  above  25%  in  absolute  to  be  data 
errors. By selecting returns above 200%, we are restricting the analyses to 
those that are extremely like to be errors.   
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Plot of annual average R² as per Equations (1) and (3).  
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Pervasive factors (SSR) Firm-specific factors (SSE)
 
Pervasive  factors  (SSR)  and  firm-specific  factors  (SSE)  were  computed  using 
Equations (1). 
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Figure 3 – Evolution of components of R², excluding non trading periods and 
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Average pervasive factors (SSR) and firm-specific factors (SSE) computed using 
Equations (1). In this graph we replicate Morck et al.‟s (2000) deletion of bi-
weekly  returns  above  25%  in  absolute  amount.  We  implement  this  sample 
trimming using weekly returns, instead of bi-weekly and therefore the impact in 
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R² - With industry factor
R² - Without industry factor
R² - Without industry factor including no industry companies
 
The line “With industry factor” represents average R² from using Equation (1). 
Lines  “Without  industry  factor”  and  “Without  industry  factor  including  no 
industry  companies”  are  based  on  Equation  (8).  The  former  uses  the  same 
sample as the normal and the latter includes companies without a valid industry 
classification. 
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